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Abstract
During the past decade, renewable energy sources have become an indispensable
pillar in European electricity generation. This paper aims at examining if the in-
creasing importance of renewables stimulates investment in European power trans-
mission networks. The question of interest is addressed by an error correction invest-
ment model that builds on Neoclassical theory and is further augmented by recent
literary findings. Under the proposed threefold estimation strategy, the share of
renewables is not found to significantly influence investment spending when the full
set of transmission system operators are considered. However, a slight and justified
sample restriction leads to the conclusion that a rising share of renewable energy
sources substantially increases investment in power transmission networks.
JEL classification: C33, L50, L94, Q42, Q48.
Keywords: Renewables, Investment, Transmission Network, Electricity.
I would like to thank my master thesis supervisor Univ.Prof. Dr. Klaus Gugler at the Research
Institute for Regulatory Economics of Vienna University of Economics and Business for his helpful sci-
entific expert advice and his motivating comments on my project. In addition, I am very grateful to Dr.
Adhurim Haxhimusa, MSc and Dr. Mario Liebensteiner for their supporting input. Finally, I
express my deepest gratitude to my family and friends for their continuous support and boundless en-
couragement that I experienced not only during my years of study, but throughout my entire life. Thank
you.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Literature Review 2
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 6
4 Econometric Modelling Approach 11
4.1 Error Correction Investment Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 Results 24
5.1 Preliminary Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2 Regression Results from the Entire Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3 Regression Results from the Restricted Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.4 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6 Policy Implications and Conclusions 43
References 44
i
1 Introduction
1 Introduction
During the past decade, renewable energy sources have become an indispensable pillar
in European electricity generation. Today, the market share of renewables amounts to
66% in Sweden, 75% in Austria and even 100% in Norway. If power from hydroelectric
sources is excluded, renewables still account for more than 25% of electricity generation
in Germany, Denmark, Estonia and Portugal (Eurostat, 2017a).
The present paper joins a rapidly growing body of literature which analyses the con-
sequences of this relatively novel energy source. More specifically, the paper aims at
examining if the increasing importance of renewables stimulates investment in European
power transmission networks.
This empirical question is addressed by an error correction model that builds on Neo-
classical investment theory and is further augmented by capital constraints, future expec-
tations, output prices, capacity considerations, interest rates and the regulatory environ-
ment. Within this framework, the proportion of renewable generation in total electricity
output constitutes the variable of main interest.
The proposed models are estimated with a threefold strategy that consists of Granger
(1969) causalities, ordinary least squares techniques and general methods of moments
procedures. While the variable of main interest is not found to significantly influence
investment spending when the full set of transmission system operators is considered, a
slight and justified sample restriction leads to the conclusion that a rising share of renew-
able energy sources substantially increases investment in power transmission networks.
What is more, evidence indicates that power transmission investment is characterised by
path dependencies and determined by an operator’s cash flow.
To summarise, the present paper is organised as follows. Section 2 begins with an
introduction to the topic of renewable energy sources by summarising the relevant litera-
ture, before Section 3 presents the available dataset. Subsequently, Section 4 establishes
the econometric modelling approach, while regression results are provided in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 states policy implications and concludes this paper.
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The theoretical framework of this paper is based on the contributions of Jorgenson (1966),
Jorgenson and Siebert (1968), Jorgenson (1971), Jorgenson (1972), Lucas (1976), Bean
(1981), Banerjee, Dolando, Galbraith, and Hendry (1993), Chirinko (1993), Hubbard
(1998), Bond, Harhoff, and Van Reenen (2005), Hassler and Wolters (2006), Bond and
Van Reenen (2007), Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2009) and Hindriks and Myles (2013) as
summarised in Section 4 below. In addition, the econometric approach pursued in this
paper builds on Granger (1969), White (1980), Nickell (1981), Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and
Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), He and Maekawa (2001), Nair-Reichert and
Weinhold (2001), Bowsher (2002), Stock and Watson (2008), Petersen (2009), Roodman
(2009), Greene (2012) as well as Wooldridge (2013).
So far, most studies which focus on the increasing importance of renewable energy
sources have analysed the issues of market prices and integration. To begin with, a
downward pressure on prices induced by renewables can be addressed theoretically with
the so-called merit order effect which is outlined in a publication of The European Wind
Energy Association (2010) and summarised in Figure 1. On the one hand, this figure
depicts a steep demand curve which reflects the relatively inelastic demand for electricity:
Should the price alter, the quantity of power demanded remains almost unchanged. On
the other hand, the dashed line represents a typical electricity supply curve. This graph
is labelled merit order curve, because it considers all generation capacities available and
orders them from the cheapest (renewables) to the most expensive (oil) power source. The
cost differences are represented by steps and primarily depend on technological reasons
and fuel prices. A stable market equilibrium can be found in the intersection of the supply
and demand curves. If the condition of perfect competition is satisfied, the market price
equals marginal cost and takes the value pA. As can be seen in Figure 1, an expansion
of renewable energy supply shifts the merit order curve to the right as represented by
the solid line. Due to the inelastic nature of demand, price decreases are very likely. In
the figure below, the price drops to the level of pB. Empirically, this merit order effect
has been confirmed1 by Munksgaard and Morthorst (2008), Jacobsen and Zvingilaite
(2010) as well as Jo´nsson, Pinson, and Madsen (2010) for Denmark, Sensfuß, Ragwitz,
and Genoese (2008), Weigt (2009) as well as Ketterer (2014) for Germany and Gelabert,
Labandeira, and Linares (2011) for Spain. What is more, Gianfreda, Parisio, and Pelagatti
(2016) find that increasing shares of renewable energy sources reduce the impact of prices
for hydrocarbon sources on the electricity price. Still, Ketterer (2014) argues that the
discussed decrease in average prices comes with a growing price volatility.
Turning to the integration of power markets, Woo, Zarnikau, Moore, and Horowitz
(2011) analyse the effect of wind generation on price discrepancies between intercon-
1See The European Wind Energy Association (2010) for a literature review.
2
2 Literature Review
Figure 1: Merit order effect. Figure adapted from The European Wind Energy Association (2010) and
Gugler et al. (2016).
nected sub-markets which lie within the Texan electricity market. Overall, the authors
find that this renewable energy source causes zonal electricity prices to diverge consider-
ably due to network congestion (Woo et al., 2011). Similarly, Grossi, Heim, Hu¨schelrath,
and Waterson (2015) focus on the interconnected European electricity market and anal-
yse how unilateral policies of the individual member states can harm this harmonised
power system. Specifically, the German support schemes for renewables are found to have
significantly reduced electricity prices not only in the fully integrated German-Austrian,
but also in adjacent electricity markets. Among these, the largest price decreases have
been identified in the Czech Republic and Denmark. What is more, the introduction of a
control for network congestion lowers the domestic, but even increases the effect on neigh-
bouring markets (Grossi et al., 2015). A resembling contribution is provided by Keppler,
Phan, and Le Pen (2016) who explore spreads in electricity prices between France and
Germany and associate solar as well as wind production with rising differences. Eventu-
ally, Gianfreda et al. (2016) examine the relationship between the growth of renewable
energy sources and European power market integration. They conclude that during peak
hours, the electricity market is now less integrated, while no change is found for off-peak
times (Gianfreda et al., 2016).
In contrast, the consequences of renewables for the power transmission network and
grid investment have thus far mainly been explored theoretically. For example, Groschke,
Eßler, Mo¨st, and Fichtner (2009) discuss the structural and locational changes of German
power plants which result, among other factors, from the expansion of wind turbines.
Consequently, the transmission distance for electrical energy rises, which faces existing
power networks with increasing challenges. Therefore, the authors present novel energy
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system models which take network constraints explicitly into account and aim at en-
hancing efficiency with regard to power plant construction, network utilisation and grid
investment (Groschke et al., 2009). In addition, Schaber, Steinke, and Hamacher (2012)
also begin with the observation that variable renewable energy sources like solar and wind
become increasingly important. Based on a regional model of the European electricity
grid, the authors argue that power network expansions are required in order to distribute
the merit order effect resulting from renewables equally in time and space, to guarantee
price stability and to protect conventional plants in regions with high capacities of re-
newables from becoming unprofitable (Schaber et al., 2012). A further contribution that
centres on the stochastic nature of renewables originates from Spiecker, Vogel, and Weber
(2013) who argue that this volatility should be accounted for during the planning process
of transmission systems and introduce a suitable model which is applied to assess the
benefits of additional grid capacities between continental and northern Europe. Fu¨rsch
et al. (2013) also state that transmission grid extensions are essential in order to cost-
efficiently achieve the European targets of 80% share of renewables and 80% reduction
of CO2 emissions in the electricity sector by 2050. Quantitatively, the authors perceive a
transmission network expansion of 228,000 kilometres between the years 2010 and 2050 as
being necessary. Another study which outlines the importance of grid investment is pro-
vided by the International Renewable Energy Agency (2015). In this paper, the concept
of base load is addressed by stating that this minimum load is a demand side character-
istic which must not be mixed up with the concept of power supply. Therefore, it is not
necessary that base demand is met by specific nuclear or coal power plants. Rather, these
plants operate continuously nowadays due to their high capital and relatively low variable
costs. As a possible alternative, this study proposes an interconnected system of flexible
(e.g. gas), dispatchable (e.g. hydro, biomass and geothermal) and variable (e.g. wind
and solar photovoltaic) power plants in order to fully cover the electricity demand. This
can, however, only be achieved by carefully planning and continuously strengthening the
power transmission grid (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015).
Another strand of literature identifies a coordination problem between investment in
generation capacities and power networks in a liberalised market environment. Ho¨ﬄer
and Wambach (2013) show that inefficient investments are likely to arise if private indi-
viduals own generation facilities and the regulator is responsible for the grid. Building on
this, Wagner (2016) formulates a theoretical model which reveals that under conventional
support schemes, wind power plants are not optimally distributed. Provided that trans-
mission grid investment follows the locations of wind turbines, inefficient power networks
are constructed (Wagner, 2016).
Building on all these contributions, the novel approach pursued in this paper aims
at identifying the link between the share of renewable energy sources and investment
in power transmission networks by using a dataset of 34 European transmission system
operators ranging from 1999 to 2015. The proposed models account for several other
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covariates which are found to significantly impact grid investment in comparable studies
published by Alesina, Ardagana, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli (2005), Bond et al. (2005),
Lyon and Mayo (2005), Cambini and Rondi (2010), Grajek and Ro¨ller (2012), Nardi
(2012), Gugler, Rammerstorfer, and Schmitt (2013), Cullmann and Nieswand (2016),
Poudineh and Jamasb (2016) and Cambini and Rondi (2017).
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The succeeding regression analysis of Section 5 relies on a number of variables and data
sources which will subsequently be introduced. Furthermore, descriptive statistics are
presented in order to provide an impression of the database’s main characteristics.
First of all, the dataset comprises an unbalanced panel of 34 European transmission
system operators ranging from 1999 to 2015. Table 1 lists these operators at the national
level, while a graphical representation can be found in Figure 2.
Table 1: Transmission system operators at the national level.
AT Austria Austrian Power Grid AG
BE Belgium Elia System Operator SA
BG Bulgaria Electricity System Operator EAD
CH Switzerland Swissgrid AG
CY Cyprus Transmission System Operator Cyprus
CZ Czech Republic Ceska´ Energeticka´ Prenosova´ Soustava AS
DE Germany 50Hertz Transmission GmbH
Amprion GmbH
TenneT TSO GmbH
TransnetBW GmbH
DK Denmark Energinet.DK
EE Estonia Elering AS
ES Spain Red Ele´ctrica de Espan˜a SA
FI Finland Fingrid OYJ
FR France Re´seau de Transport d’Electricite´, SA
GR Greece Independent Power Transmission Operator SA
HR Croatia Croatian Transmission System Operator Ltd
HU Hungary Magyarorsza´g A´tviteli Ha´lo´zata
IE Ireland Eirgrid Plc
IT Italy Terna - Rete Elettrica Nazionale
LT Lithuania Litgrid AB
LU Luxembourg Creos Luxembourg SA
LV Latvia Augstsprieguma T¯ıkls AS
NL Netherlands Tennet TSO BV
NO Norway Statnett SF
PL Poland Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne
PT Portugal Redes Energe´ticas Nacionais, SGPS, SA
RO Romania Compania Nationala de Transport al Energiei Electrice Transelectrica SA
SE Sweden Svenska Kraftna¨t
SI Slovenia Elektro-Slovenija, doo
SK Slovak Republic Slovenska´ Elektrizacna´ Prenosova´ Su´stava, AS
UK United Kingdom National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc
Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission Plc
System Operator of Northern Ireland Ltd
In respect of the underlying research question, the proportion of renewable generation
in total electricity output, which is categorised into two different types, constitutes the
variable of main interest in this paper. Specifically, the numerator of the first proposed
parameter captures the renewable sources of wind, solar, different forms of bio fuels, mu-
nicipal waste, geothermics, tide, wave as well as ocean, but excludes hydroelectric power
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Figure 2: Sample at the national level. Illustrated in Mathematica.
and is therefore labelled share of renewables (without hydro). This exclusion is under-
taken because unlike the remaining renewable electricity sources, water power constitutes
a base load component2 (Gugler et al., 2016). The second proposed measure is referred
to as share of renewables (total) as its numerator also contains electricity generated from
hydroelectric sources. This variable is employed in Section 5.4 for robustness checks of the
main regression results. Turning to the denominator, both measures incorporate the total
annual electricity generated from all sources. Finally, both parameters rely on Eurostat
(2017a) and are available for the period from 2004 to 2015 at the national level. It is
therefore assumed that all transmission system operators within a country offer the same
energy mix3.
The two types of this paper’s main variable of interest are illustrated in Figure 3 and
Figure 4 for a set of eight selected countries (Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy,
Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom). As depicted by Figure 3, the market share
of renewables excluding hydroelectric power amounted to less than 10% in all considered
countries at the beginning of the observation period, but exhibited a rising trend in the
subsequent years. Until 2015, Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom experienced
the largest growth, while the rate of increase was smaller in Austria, Poland and France.
2It can also be argued that geothermics and - to a certain extent - some sorts of bio fuels also supply the
base load. Therefore, the issue of (solid) bio fuels will be readdressed in Section 5.3 below. As statistics
are, however, not separately available for the remaining types of suspected base load components, it is
not possible to preclude them. This minor inaccuracy is not expected to bias the results, because the
relative importance of these miscellaneous sources is negligible.
3This assumption is of particular relevance for Germany and the United Kingdom, where more than
one transmission system operator exists.
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Figure 3: Proportion of renewable generation without hydroelectric power in total electricity output.
Data from Eurostat (2017a). Illustrated in Mathematica.
Turning to the total share of renewables summarised in Figure 4 evidences that hydro-
electric sources play a significant role in Austria and Sweden. Again, the proportion of
renewable energy sources increases in the entire sample with the most substantial growth
in Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, two variables are crucial in order to analyse the transmission operators’
investment behaviour, namely the capital expenditure on tangible fixed assets and the
stock of tangible fixed assets. As discussed in Section 4.1, these indicators constitute the
investment rate which serves as the dependent variable in all regression models. Data for
these variables was provided by the operators either directly upon request or indirectly
through their annual reports.
In addition, transmission system operators’ data concerning cash flow and revenues
originates from the Orbis Database of Bureau Van Dijk (2017). In Section 4.1, the former
variable will be divided by the tangible fixed assets in order to establish the cash flow rate.
Moreover, the variable capturing the harmonised index of consumer prices for electric-
ity is published by Eurostat (2017b) and normalised to 100 as of 2015 for all countries.
Again, electricity prices are assumed as homogeneous for all operators within a certain
country.
Further, load data emphasises the demand side and constitutes itself from figures of
the monthly electricity consumption in gigawatt hours provided by the European Network
of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (2015). As figures are only available at
the national level, they are allocated to the various operators in Germany and the United
Kingdom with respect to their relative tangible fixed assets.
What is more, the long term interest rate is based on the EMU convergence criterion
bond yields made available by Eurostat (2016) for all countries and therefore transmission
system operators except for Estonia, where this indicator is not applicable. In order not
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Figure 4: Proportion of renewable generation in total electricity output. Data from Eurostat (2017a).
Illustrated in Mathematica.
to entirely exclude this country, its real lending interest rate provided by the World Bank
(2017) is utilised as a substitute.
Finally, the regulatory indicators are published by the Organisation of Economic Co-
operation and Development (2017) and cover the dimensions of entry, public ownership,
vertical integration as well as market structure in the electricity sector. Quantitatively,
these measures range between zero and six, where lower values imply a more liberalised
business environment (Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, 2017).
The following Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables under considera-
tion.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the variables under consideration. Implemented in R. Table adapted
from stargazer (Hlavac, 2015).
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Share of Renewables without Hydro (Ratio) (1) 396 0.086 0.082 0.000 0.513
Share of Renewables Total (Ratio) (2) 396 0.228 0.210 0.000 1.000
Capital Expenditure on Tangible Fixed Assets (Million euro) (3) 281 289.500 352.800 2.792 1,764.000
Tangible Fixed Assets (Million euro) (4) 310 2,582.000 3,280.000 14.010 16,170.000
Investment Rate (Ratio) (5) 258 0.141 0.103 0.011 0.932
Cash Flow (Million euro) (6) 234 231.600 330.700 −72.790 1,640.000
Cash Flow Rate (Ratio) (7) 177 0.115 0.142 −0.638 1.309
Revenues (Million euro) (8) 247 1,615.000 2,699.000 1.990 15,618.000
Consumer Prices for Electricity (Index) (9) 560 0.776 0.210 0.285 1.544
Load (Gigawatt Hours per Year) (10) 396 97,620.000 113,690.000 283.200 513,292.000
Long Term Interest Rate (Percentage Points) (11) 508 4.328 2.087 0.370 22.500
Regulation Entry (Index) (12) 426 1.008 1.662 0.000 6.000
Regulation Public Ownership (Index) (13) 426 3.038 2.243 0.000 6.000
Regulation Vertical Integration (Index) (14) 426 4.541 0.763 2.438 6.000
Regulation Market Structure (Index) (15) 389 1.382 2.010 0.000 6.000
Lastly, Table 3 shows correlations among all indicators, whose respective numbers are
quoted in Table 2.
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The aim of this section is to develop an investment model and afterwards to define how
to estimate it empirically. Therefore, Section 4.1 starts with a Neoclassical model of
investment behaviour, before augmenting it with recent findings in the literature. Finally,
Section 4.2 summarises the threefold estimation strategy.
4.1 Error Correction Investment Model
The roots of the model presented here lie in the Neoclassical theory of investment be-
haviour pioneered by Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) and Jorgenson (1971). These studies
start with a flexible accelerator model that focuses on a profit maximising firm’s invest-
ment strategy. Defined more closely, a firm is assumed to have a desired level of capital
stock K∗t that depends on its long-run expectations. Furthermore, as the actual capital
stock is denoted by Kt, the following Equation 1 illustrates that at each period t, the focal
firm adjusts its capital stock to the target level by a constant rate (1−κ) of the difference
between desired and current capital (Jorgenson & Siebert, 1968) (Jorgenson, 1971).
Kt −Kt−1 = (1− κ) ∗ (K∗t −Kt−1) (1)
Equation 2 provides an alternative measure of the actual capital stock by representing
current capital Kt as the weighted average of all preceding levels of targeted capital, K
∗
t−s.
It should further be noted that the weights µs only take positive values and that their
sum equals unity (Jorgenson & Siebert, 1968).
Kt =
∞∑
s=0
µs ∗K∗t−s (2)
This distributed lag function is called flexible accelerator model and can be further
developed to a comprehensive investment theory by making use of the definition from
accounting that actual changes in the capital stock correspond to gross investment It, less
replacement expenditure. In general, it is assumed that these expenses for restoration are
proportional to the capital stock of the preceding period. Equation 3 summarises this
relation and regards the rate of depreciation δ as a fixed constant (Jorgenson & Siebert,
1968).
Kt −Kt−1 ≡ It − δKt−1 (3)
Differencing Equation 2 and combining it with Equation 3 yields the following gener-
alised accelerator mechanism (Jorgenson & Siebert, 1968).
It =
∞∑
s=0
µs ∗ (K∗t−s −K∗t−s−1) + δKt−1 (4)
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In Equation 4, the sequence of weights goes to infinity, which means that the actual
investments are determined by all preceding desired levels of capital stock. Obviously,
this generous inclusion of the past makes parameter estimations impossible. It is therefore
of crucial importance to find an appropriate lag distribution that realistically corresponds
to investment patterns. Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) rely on a Pascal distributed lag
function4 and explain current gross investment by actual as well as previous changes in the
desired level of capital stock, lagged net investment and present replacement expenditure,
as shown in Equation 5.
It = ζ1(K
∗
t −K∗t−1) + ζ2(K∗t−1 −K∗t−2)− ζ3(It−1 − δKt−2) + δKt−1 (5)
A subsequent important step is to find an expression for K∗t . This requested stock
of capital is assumed to be proportional (expressed by γ) to the ratio between a firm’s
revenues Yt and the rental price of capital Ct. Furthermore, the model presented in
Equation 6 supposes that the focal firm is faced with a production function characterised
by a constant elasticity of substitution σ between capital and variable inputs (Jorgenson,
1971) (Chirinko, 1993).
K∗t = γYtC
−σ
t (6)
The equations derived so far lead to the formulation of the Neoclassical model of
investment. Specifically, combining Equation 4 with Equation 6 yields the following spec-
ification
It =
S∑
s=0
ι ∗ µs ∗∆(Yt−sC−σt−s) + δKt−1 + t, (7)
where S has already been chosen (e.g. accordingly with Equation 5), ι is a parameter,
∆ denotes the delta operator and t is a zero mean as well as constant variance error term
(Chirinko, 1993).
With respect to the real world, it is advantageous to extend the Neoclassical investment
model by taking explicitly into account that the firm’s investment behaviour may be
affected by financing constraints. More specifically, an organisation could be faced with
different costs for internal and external financing, should a setting of imperfect information
in capital markets be considered. Then, if a firm’s investments rely on external funds,
the lenders are not able to accurately assess the quality and risk of a certain undertaking.
4This type of lag function relies on the Pascal probability distribution and takes the form
at =
(1− ξ)d
(1− ξL)d ∗ bt,
where 0 < ξ < 1, d > 0 and L is the lag operator (Jorgenson, 1966).
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Figure 5: Capital market imperfections and the cost of funds. Figure adapted from Hubbard (1998).
Therefore, they require a premium for the compensation of potential adverse selection5,
moral hazard6 and monitoring costs (Hubbard, 1998).
This relationship is illustrated graphically in Figure 5, where the organisation’s capital
can be found on the horizontal and the cost of funds on the vertical axis. Graph D
illustrates that the firm’s demand for capital decreases as a result of higher prices for
(external) means, while D’s location depends on the investment opportunities of the
focal organisation. In a strictly Neoclassical setting, the presumed perfect information
regarding profitability, risk and production technologies justifies constant costs of funds S
that amount to the (risk-adjusted) real rate of interest r. This means that the organisation
is able to borrow any desired amount at r and that its opportunity cost of internal liquid
assets equals this market interest rate. As can be seen in Figure 5, Kn denotes the first-
best capital stock which lies in the intersection of S and D. Therefore, the firm’s internal
pecuniary resources per se do not affect its decision whether to invest or not (Hubbard,
1998).
A more realistic framework is based on the assumption that an entrepreneur enjoys a
net worth ofW0 and can undertake a certain project that requires capital and other factors
of production. These other inputs comprise organisational or maintenance expenditure,
enhance the productivity of existing capital and are subsumed under the term soft capital.
As the opportunity cost of the firm’s net worth equals r∗W0, the risk-neutral entrepreneur
would invest in the project if, and only if, its yield is larger than (1 + r) ∗W0. How does
5To provide an example, if suppliers and demanders of loans have different levels of information
regarding the associated risks available, credible borrowers are expected to be driven out of the market
by defaulters. Therefore, those individuals of unfavourable character remain (Hindriks & Myles, 2013).
6It is likely that the creditor cannot observe the actions of the debtor, who controls the usage of the
funds (Hubbard, 1998) (Hindriks & Myles, 2013).
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the situation, however, look if the entrepreneur requires more capital than W0 and has to
acquire external funds? At this point, an agency problem can be introduced by assuming
that the organisation’s creditors are able to observe expenditure on the capital stock,
but not those on the soft capital. This might induce the entrepreneur to redirect the
funds for the latter type of capital to his personal benefit and hold bad luck liable for
any default. As a consequence, for uncollateralised financing exceeding the level of W0,
a forward-looking creditor requires a premium to be compensated for the existing risk
of opportunistic behaviour. This is depicted by the upward-sloping part of S(W0) and
implies that the entrepreneur is faced with different shadow costs for internal and external
financing. It should further be noted that D and S(W0) intersect at the capital stock K0,
which lies below the strict Neoclassical solution and signifies considerable underinvestment
(Hubbard, 1998).
Ceteris paribus, a rise in the organisation’s net worth fromW0 toW1 shifts the supply-
of-funds curve rightwards to S(W1) and the entrepreneur’s possibilities to divert funds
decrease. As a result, the equilibrium capital stock rises to K1 (Hubbard, 1998).
To summarise, as long as the firm’s net worth is belowKn, the external lenders demand
a compensation for the information asymmetries and the origin of funds might influence
investment behaviour. Therefore, an investment model like Equation 7 should also control
for the firm’s net value that can be approximated by cash flow (Hubbard, 1998).
It should have become apparent that the investment model presented so far further
relies on a number of simplifying assumptions as capital adjustment costs and, to a certain
extent, lags between investment orders and delivery are not considered (Chirinko, 1993).
In addition, the theoretical model outlined in Equation 7 can be criticised with regard
to consistency issues. First of all, simultaneous interactions between the explanatory
variables (e.g. the relationship between the firm’s user cost of capital and its optimal
level of output) are not taken into account. Furthermore, if the production technology
of the considered firm exhibits constant returns to scale, K∗t can only be regarded as a
“moving target rather than the long-run equilibrium of capital” (Jorgenson, 1972, p. 246)
(Chirinko, 1993).
Another question concerns the way in which technological aspects are captured by
the model. To begin with, vintage effects are implicitly assumed away although it seems
conceivable that after the installation of a capital good, the combination possibilities with
other inputs cannot be chosen arbitrarily any more. In addition, treating the depreciation
rate δ as exogenous and given raises doubts, because empirical investigations do not
unambiguously justify this assumption (Chirinko, 1993).
Furthermore, Lucas (1976) states in his well-known critique that even if an econometric
model contains optimal heuristics of economic individuals, alterations of the policy frame-
work should change the model’s structure, because agents’ optimal decisions depend on
the policy foundations. With regard to investment models, expectation parameters ought
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to be identified separately from the policy invariant technology parameters. The coef-
ficients in the Neoclassical model presented in Equation 7 are, however, a mixture of
expectation as well as technology parameters and therefore exposed to the Lucas (1976)
critique (Chirinko, 1993). Similarly, if a firm’s net worth is approximated by its cash flow,
a positive and significant relationship between this variable and investment expenditure
does not necessarily mean that raising external funds is indeed more costly than internal
financing. Specifically, if current cash flow positively affects expected future profitabil-
ity, investments could rise due to enhanced expectations (shifting curve D in Figure 5 to
the right) rather than the rise in internal funds available. Separating out investment op-
portunities adequately is, however, extremely challenging (Hubbard, 1998) and therefore
beyond the scope of this paper.
The final set of controversies concerning the Neoclassical model emerges from the rel-
ative importance of the investment determinants summarised in Equation 7, particularly
∆Yt and ∆Ct. Although empirical studies do not provide consistent results, it seems that
output is the dominant determinant (Chirinko, 1993).
Keeping the discussed caveats of the Neoclassical model in mind and realising that
structural models of investment dynamics which permit the assumption of capital adjust-
ment costs (e.g. Q model, Euler equation model) do not portray the complex adaptation
fairly successfully, makes intermediate modelling approaches seem attractive. In general,
such reduced form models empirically approximate the complex adjustment process which
has generated the observed data. It should be noted, however, that these models are still
affected by the Lucas (1976) critique as their parameters are an amalgam of structural
adjustment and expectations-formation variables (Bond & Van Reenen, 2007). Since this
paper seeks to identify fundamental determinants of investment rather than defining an
underlying structural adjustment process, a reduced form model is nevertheless suitable
for answering the underlying research question.
Therefore, the development of an investment model continues by taking the logarithm
of Equation 6, leading to the following specification
k∗t = γ + yt − σct, (8)
where a lower-case character denotes a variable in logarithmic form. For simplicity,
it is assumed that σ takes a value of one, corresponding to a Cobb-Douglas production
function7 (Bond et al., 2005).
In order to allow for dynamic interactions, Equation 8 is addressed by an autoregressive
distributed lag (ADL) model, which is defined as follows (Hassler & Wolters, 2006).
7A Cobb-Douglas production function takes the form Y = F (K,N) = Γ∗Kφ1 ∗Nφ2 , where Y denotes
output, determined by the inputs capital K as well as labour N and φ1 as well as φ2 lie between zero
and one. If φ1 + φ2 = 1, a firm produces with constant returns to scale, meaning that a doubling of both
factors of production doubles the output (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009)
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at =
U∑
u=1
ψu ∗ at−u +
V∑
v=0
ω′v ∗ bt−v + t (9)
While at designates a scalar variable, bt summarises a column vector of dimension
M. Accordingly, the coefficients ψu denote scalars and ω
′
v row vectors. Furthermore, the
scalar t is an error term with a mean of zero and a constant variance. In addition, the
commonly included constant is neglected here to keep the model as simple as possible.
Finally, in order to fulfil the condition of dynamic stability, |∑Uu=1 ψu| must be less than
1 (Hassler & Wolters, 2006).
Transforming Equation 8 into an ADL-model and considering the unbalanced structure
of the panel dataset as outlined in Section 3 by setting U = V = 1 yields the subsequent
dynamic regression model, where αi, βi and θi are parameters.
k∗t = γ + α1k
∗
t−1 + β0yt + β1yt−1 − θ0ct − θ1ct−1 + t (10)
In a static equilibrium, k∗t , yt and ct are treated as jointly stationary
8 and therefore,
taking the expected value from both sides of Equation 10 yields the following specification
(Banerjee et al., 1993).
E(k∗t ) =
γ + (β0 + β1) ∗ E(yt)− (θ0 + θ1) ∗ E(ct)
1− α1 (11)
Equation 11 illustrates that the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to output is
given by
β0 + β1
1− α1
and with respect to the rental price of capital by
−θ0 + θ1
1− α1 .
To go one step further, Bean (1981) suggests to transform the model presented by Equa-
tion 10 into an error-correction form. This can be done by subtracting k∗t−1 from both
sides and further adding to, as well as deducting from, the specification’s right-hand side
the term β0yt−1 + (α1 − 1) ∗ yt−1 (Banerjee et al., 1993). The result is summarised in
Equation 12.
8Under the assumption of strict stationarity, a stochastic process (i.e. an ordered series of random
variables) has to fulfil the subsequent condition.
F (x(p1), x(p2), ..., x(pn)) = F (x(p1 + q), x(p2 + q), ..., x(pn + q))
Here, x is the stochastic process, while p1, p2, ..., pn denotes a subset of the index set P = {1, 2, ..., T} and
q can be any real number, provided that pi + q ∈ P if i = 1, 2, ..., n. Finally, F (·) designates the joint
distribution function of the n entries (Banerjee et al., 1993).
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∆k∗t = γ + (α1 − 1) ∗ (k∗t−1 − yt−1) + β0 ∗∆yt + (β0 + β1 + α1 − 1) ∗ yt−1
−θ0 ∗ ct − θ1 ∗ ct−1 + t
(12)
It is of particular importance that Equation 10 and Equation 12 represent the same
relationship between the exogenous and endogenous variables of interest as the equality
has not been violated and the error process has been conserved. The advantage of such
an error correction model lies in the feature that the speed of the short-run adjustment
to a disequilibrium is explicitly captured by the term (α1 − 1) (Banerjee et al., 1993).
In order to complete the evolution of this paper’s base model, the subsequent five
further widely adopted principles are applied on Equation 12.
• First of all,
∆k∗t = ∆kt ≈
It
Kt−1
− δ, (13)
where, as before, It denotes a company’s investment, Kt−1 its capital stock one
period earlier and δ the depreciation rate (Bond & Van Reenen, 2007). As in
Alesina et al. (2005), Cambini and Rondi (2010), Gugler et al. (2013), Cullmann
and Nieswand (2016), Poudineh and Jamasb (2016) and Cambini and Rondi (2017),
the rate of depreciation is, however, incorporated in the individual firm fixed effects
(see below). Therefore, the fraction
It
Kt−1
is labelled investment ratet.
• Secondly, the investment rate of the previous period enters the specification’s right-
hand side (Alesina et al., 2005) (Bond et al., 2005) (Cambini & Rondi, 2010) (Gugler
et al., 2013) (Cullmann & Nieswand, 2016) (Poudineh & Jamasb, 2016) (Cambini
& Rondi, 2017).
• As discussed previously, an investment model should control for the firm’s net worth
which can be approximated by current cash flow. Following the methodology of
Bond et al. (2005), Cambini and Rondi (2010) as well as Cambini and Rondi (2017),
the variable
Cash F lowt
Kt−1
is added to Equation 12 and will be called cash flow ratet from now on.
• Analogous to Gugler et al. (2013), the rental price of capital c is assumed to be
inversely captured by the harmonised consumer price index of electricity. This
prerequisite is justified by the fact that c depends on the ratio between the purchase
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price of additional capital and the output price (Gugler et al., 2013). It should
however be noted that consumer prices are not related to the transmission system
operators’ cash flow and revenues, as summarised in Table 3. Still, the electricity
price index is highly correlated with the investment rate and several other covariates
which qualifies this variable as indispensable for the analysis conducted in this paper.
• In order to account for those unobserved factors affecting the investment rate which
are constant over time and to allow for differences across years firm, as well as year,
fixed effects are included in Equation 12. Alesina et al. (2005), Lyon and Mayo
(2005), Cambini and Rondi (2010), Grajek and Ro¨ller (2012), Gugler et al. (2013),
Cullmann and Nieswand (2016) and Cambini and Rondi (2017) pursue comparable
strategies. The respective dummies are labelled with ηi and νt.
To summarise, the following Equation 14 shows the error correction investment model
proposed in this paper. In order to curtail concerns with regard to endogeneity problems,
all explanatory variables are lagged by one period (see for example Gugler et al. (2013)).
Furthermore, λj denotes a specific coefficient, i the firm and t the time index. Finally, ηi,
νt as well as i,t take values as defined above.
Investment Ratei,t
= λ1 ∗ Investment Ratei,t−1 + λ2 ∗ log(Tangible F ixed Assets)i,t−1
+ λ3 ∗ log(Revenues)i,t−1 + λ4 ∗ log(Consumer Price)i,t−1
+ λ5 ∗∆ log(Revenues)i,t + λ6 ∗ Cash F low Ratei,t−1
+ ηi + νt + i,t
(14)
In this model, a positive and significant coefficient λ1 would suggest a path dependency
and therefore highlight that adjustment costs are prevailing in the electricity sector. What
is more, λ2 and λ3 assess the error correction of the model. Particularly, an error correction
mechanism is verified provided that λ2 takes a significantly negative and λ3 a significantly
positive value, respectively. It should further be noted that λ2 − λ3 < 0 in order to
produce a stable equilibrium. In addition, λ4 captures the relationship between electricity
consumer prices and grid investment. Moreover, accelerator effects are captured by λ5,
where a significantly positive coefficient would be in line with the Neoclassical theories
discussed above. Finally, λ6 does not only control for financial constraints, but also for
an organisation’s expectations. Therefore, this coefficient is expected to take a positive
value (Bond et al., 2005) (Gugler et al., 2013).
In order to further simplify the relationship of interest, a number of models presented
in Section 5 below do not control for the error correction processes and therefore take the
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form of Equation 15, whose interpretation is analogous to Equation 14.
Investment Ratei,t
= ρ1 ∗ Investment Ratei,t−1 + ρ4 ∗ log(Consumer Price)i,t−1
+ ρ5 ∗∆ log(Revenues)i,t + ρ6 ∗ Cash F low Ratei,t−1
+ ηi + νt + i,t
(15)
Having described the base models of this paper, it is worth noting that specifications
similar to Equation 14 and Equation 15 have been estimated by various studies. Explicit
examples comprise the contributions of Alesina et al. (2005), Bond et al. (2005), Lyon and
Mayo (2005), Cambini and Rondi (2010), Grajek and Ro¨ller (2012), Nardi (2012), Gugler
et al. (2013), Cullmann and Nieswand (2016), Poudineh and Jamasb (2016) as well as
Cambini and Rondi (2017).
The novel contribution of this paper lies in linking the current share of renewable energy
resources with the investment models outlined in Equation 14 and Equation 15. It has to
be determined empirically if a larger dominance of renewable energy sources is connected
with enhanced investment in power transmission networks. Therefore, Equation 14 is
extended by the two measures of renewable generation as a share of total electricity
output which were defined in Section 3 as share of renewables (without hydro) and share
of renewables (total). While the former parameter enters into the full set of models, the
latter is utilised for robustness checks.
Referring to the underlying research question, the main interest of this paper lies in
identifying the coefficients associated with these two measures. It should be recalled that
significantly positive coefficients lead to the conclusion that a rising share of renewables
indeed stimulates the power transmission investments necessary for a stable grid. On the
contrary, insignificant (or even significantly negative) coefficients would find no evidence
that transmission networks are adapted to the challenges associated with the increas-
ing importance of renewable energy resources and could therefore be seen as a threat
potentially causing congestion and network instability.
In order to thoroughly examine the coefficients of interest, the model is further ex-
panded consecutively by the subsequent covariates.
• The logarithm of electrical load as yearly average in order to control for capacity
constraints. This strategy resembles the contributions of Lyon and Mayo (2005) and
Poudineh and Jamasb (2016).
• The logarithm of the long term interest rate, similar to Alesina et al. (2005), Lyon
and Mayo (2005), Cambini and Rondi (2010), Gugler et al. (2013) and Cullmann
and Nieswand (2016) in order to approximate the operators’ weighted average cost
of capital.
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• The regulatory indicators for entry, public ownership, vertical integration and market
structure, respectively, comparable with Alesina et al. (2005), Grajek and Ro¨ller
(2012), Nardi (2012), Gugler et al. (2013), Cullmann and Nieswand (2016), Poudineh
and Jamasb (2016) as well as Esposito, Kaloud, Doleschel, and Urban-Kozlowska
(in press).
Detailed definitions of these variables have been summarised in Section 3 above. Before the
models’ results are presented in Section 5, the applied estimation strategies are outlined
in the following subsection.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
In order to properly address the relationship of interest, this paper proposes a threefold
strategy. More specifically, the analysis starts with testing for causality among all vari-
ables and thereby relies on the techniques published by Granger (1969). Subsequently, in
order to provide benchmark results, fixed effects estimates are presented. Finally, endo-
geneity concerns are diminished by applying the one step first-differenced GMM estimator
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Granger (1969) causalities To begin with, Granger (1969) argues that difficulties
exist with regard to causality issues among two linked variables. The author therefore
provides the following definition of causality for a stationary stochastic process9. Provided
that At and Bt are indeed stationary time series with a mean of 0, if
σ2(A|A,B) < σ2(A|A), (16)
Bt ⇒ At. In Equation 16, a bar over a variable represents its past values and σ designates
the error variance.
Similarly, if
σ2(A|A,B) < σ2(A|A),
σ2(B|A,B) < σ2(B|B),
(17)
feedback between the two variables (indicated by At ⇔ Bt) can be identified (Granger,
1969).
Referring back to the condition established in Equation 16, Granger (1969) proposes
the subsequent linear model to empirically test for causality.
At =
J∑
j=1
αjAt−j +
J∑
j=1
βjBt−j + t (18)
9A stochastic process is a series of random variables (Wooldridge, 2013).
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While J could theoretically tend towards infinity, a practical approach is to associate it
with a finite integer. Presuming that t is again an independent and identically distributed
error term, Bt causes At if at least one βj is significantly different from zero (Granger,
1969).
It should have become apparent that the concept of causality outlined here relies
on the criterion of minimising the error variance. Granger (1969) recognises that other
criteria might exist, but also states that the advantage of this variance approach lies in its
unproblematic way of implementation and its straightforward interpretation. However,
the author suggests to refer to his approach by using the term causality in mean (Granger,
1969).
Even more importantly, Granger (1969) causalities could suffer from considerable bi-
ases. The first source of bias becomes evident from Equation 18 directly and refers to
only considering two variables in the regression. If, however, a third series Ht caused
both At and Bt, spurious causality between the two latter variables would likely be found
(Granger, 1969). Secondly, He and Maekawa (2001) show that the conventional F test
statistics10 identify spurious Granger (1969) causality for non-stationary series relatively
often. These considerations indicate that Granger (1969) causality tests might determine
causality all too frequently.
Similar to comparable studies (see for example Edwards and Waverman (2006), Gasmi
and Recuero Virto (2010), Resende (2009), Bortolotti, Cambini, Rondi, and Spiegel
(2011), Cambini and Rondi (2012) and Gugler et al. (2013)), strict Granger (1969) causal-
ities are calculated in this paper in order to detect possible reverse causal relationships
among the variables of interest. Therefore, it seems reasonable to employ this over-
sensitive test.
Fixed Effects Estimation Having identified possible causality flows, the analysis digs
deeper by estimating the relationship derived above with ordinary least squares. Section 3
pointed out that the available data comprises an (unbalanced) panel. In order to allow for
fundamental differences in the dependent variable which arise out of unobservable fixed
factors among the considered firms and years, it proves beneficial to deduct the firm as
well as temporal average of each observation11. As long as these unobserved factors are
constant for firms over time and for time periods over firms, this procedure is conductive in
diminishing concerns with regard to omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2013). As pointed
out by Nickell (1981), specifications similar to Equation 14 can, however, not be estimated
consistently with the fixed effects estimator due to their autoregressive structure. More
specifically, a simple time-demeaned model takes the form
10Testing in Equation 18 for the restriction that
∑J
j=1 βj = 0 (Wooldridge, 2013).
11An equivalent strategy would be to include a dummy for each firm and time period in the estimation
equation (Wooldridge, 2013).
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at − 1
T
∗
T∑
t=1
at = α
(
at−1 − 1
T
∗
T−1∑
t=0
at
)
+
(
t − 1
T
∗
T∑
t=1
t
)
. (19)
Obviously, 1
T
∗∑Tt=1 t is not only correlated with at−1, but also with at. This produces
a bias in α even if the number of firms in the sample tends towards infinity as long as the
amount of time periods (T ) available remains small (Nickell, 1981) (Bond & Van Reenen,
2007).
On the other hand, Lyon and Mayo (2005), Alesina et al. (2005), Cambini and Rondi
(2010), Gugler et al. (2013), Cullmann and Nieswand (2016) as well as Poudineh and
Jamasb (2016) show that path dependencies play a crucial role with regard to investments
in the electricity sector. Excluding the lagged investment rate is therefore likely to create
a considerable omitted variable bias, resulting from dependencies between this factor and
the remaining regressors (Wooldridge, 2013).
These considerations in mind, the empirical strategy proposed in this paper opts for
including the lagged dependent variable when performing fixed effects estimations. There-
fore, prudence should be exerted when interpreting these benchmark results. Moreover,
the error correction mechanism which focuses on specific interaction between past and
current observations is exclusively modelled with general methods of moments techniques
that are discussed below.
General Method of Moments Estimation Specifications like Equation 14 are ade-
quately addressed by using the general methods of moments (GMM) estimation technique
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This difference estimator performs the subse-
quent two steps. First, an estimation equation’s variables are replaced by their respective
changes over time in order to remove all unobservable fixed effects. Secondly, the variables
in the equation are instrumented with their past values12.
In doing so, it is of crucial importance that the error term is not serially correlated.
Obviously, if serial correlation among the errors is an issue, preceding terms correlate with
the current one and the requirement for exogeneity of instruments is not fulfilled. Should,
12The idea of instrumental variables estimation in its simplest way can be illustrated with a cross-
sectional model. Provided that a is explained by the exogenous variable b and by another variable b˜ that
correlates with elements of the error term , simply estimating the following equation with ordinary least
squares would produce biased and inconsistent coefficients (Wooldridge, 2013).
a = β0 + β1b+ β2b˜+ 
A way to address this problem of omitted variables lies in finding an instrument for b˜. Such an instrumental
variable e must fulfil the conditions of exogeneity (i.e. Cov(e, ) = 0) as well as relevance (i.e. Cov(b˜, e) =
0) even after partialling out b. Then, b˜ is computed as shown in the subsequent regression, where the
symbol ̂ denotes an estimated variable or coefficient (Wooldridge, 2013).
̂˜
b = pi0 + pi1b+ pi2e
Finally, b˜ is replaced by
̂˜
b and consistent estimators for the coefficients are identified. Analogously, even
reverse causality issues can properly be addressed by instrumental variable techniques (Wooldridge, 2013).
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on the contrary, the application of GMM be justified, issues regarding reverse causality
are properly addressed and autoregressive processes can be estimated consistently even
for finite sample sizes. Based on the specific estimation procedure, Arellano and Bond
(1991) propose two different GMM techniques which they label one step and two step
estimators. In an application, the authors suspect a finite sample bias in the standard
errors estimated with the latter (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Therefore, this paper prefers
and applies the former one step estimator.
Estimation of Standard Errors Particularly in the context of panel data, it is worth
putting special attention on the techniques associated with the calculation of standard
errors which depend on the assumptions made with regard to the variance of the error
term. In the most simplified setting, the vector of disturbances has a constant variance
that is independent from the explanatory variables, including individual and temporal
fixed effects (Wooldridge, 2013). As this restrictive assumption does not seem convincing
in empirical applications, White (1980) presents an estimator for the parameter covari-
ance matrix to achieve heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in an OLS framework13.
Moreover, Petersen (2009) argues that standard errors in a panel dataset should in general
be expected to correlate among individuals, implying that correcting for heteroskedastic-
ity is not enough. Therefore, all standard errors presented in the subsequent sections are
not only robust, but also clustered at the firm level and therefore in accordance with the
ideas of Stock and Watson (2008).
13In an OLS framework, heteroskedasticity can simply be defined as V ar(i|bi) = σ2i , where i denotes
the error term, bi the vector of regressors and i an index variable (Greene, 2012).
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5 Results
Building on the previous discussion, the present section presents the core results of this
paper. After showing some preliminary relations between the variables of interest, regres-
sion results are summarised for the full and a restricted sample, before robustness checks
are performed.
5.1 Preliminary Evidence
As a first step, this subsection tests for causality between the variables of interest and
relies on the ideas of Granger (1969) which were outlined in Section 4.2. However, the
panel structure of the available dataset requires the incorporation of further contributions
of Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) as well as Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001). Specifically,
for each pair of variables, the onestep difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond
(1991) with time fixed effects is applied. Referring to Equation 18 in Section 4.2 above, J
is set 1 due to the considerable amount of missing values in the available dataset.
As pointed out by Roodman (2009), the number of instruments required for a GMM
estimation increases quadratically in the panel’s time dimension. Consequently, a large
amount of instruments can be expected, which is likely to bias the coefficients of instru-
mented regressors as a result of over-fitting them14.
What is more, as long as the amount of instruments outnumbers the parameters,
the condition of exogeneity can be evaluated with the Hansen test of over-identifying
restrictions. The test’s null hypothesis assumes that all instruments are valid and therefore
that the second stage residuals are not correlated with any specific set of them (Roodman,
2009) (Wooldridge, 2013). If the amount of instruments gets large, however, the Hansen
test loses power dramatically and implausible p-values of 1.00 are generated (Bowsher,
2002) (Roodman, 2009).
These considerations raise the question of the appropriate number of instruments.
Roodman (2009) states that the literature does not provide a clear recommendation with
regard to this issue and offers the amount of individual units as an “arbitrary rule of
thumb” (Roodman, 2009, p. 99) for the instrument count. Considering the summarised
concerns, the models presented in this study aim at holding the number of instruments
small by either restricting the amount of lags for instrumenting endogenous variables
to two or considering more lags, but collapsing the instruments to one single column.
Furthermore, Hansen p-values are systematically reported in order to detect implausible
test statistics.
In Table 4, Granger (1969) causalities between the investment rate and all explanatory
14Specifically, should the count of instruments equal the amount of observations, the first-stage regres-
sion produces a perfect fit and
̂˜
b equals b˜. Consequently, the IV-results perfectly match those of OLS,
which are biased by assumption (Roodman, 2009).
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variables15 are reported. Within this framework, the investment rate evaluated at time t
serves as the dependent variable and is explained by its lag as well as by the lagged values
of the respective column variable. As pointed out in Section 4.2, the GMM estimator is
required in this dynamic environment as it permits previous error terms to be correlated
with the current realisation of the dependent variable. The respective column variable is,
however, regarded as exogenous, but nevertheless not utilised as an external instrument
in the first differenced equation16.
Referring to the coefficients and test statistics in Table 4, interpretation patterns are
presented based on Column 1. This model explains the current investment rate by its
lagged value as well as by the lagged and logarithmised price index and reveals that the
two regressors significantly Granger (1969) cause the dependent variable. Furthermore,
as has been outlined above, the applied estimation strategy controls for unobserved firm
as well as time fixed effects. In addition, the number of observations amounts to 204 and
the instrument count to 36, while the Hansen test p-value of 0.82 does not raise concern.
Finally, the bottom two lines in Column 1 summarise tests for possible autocorrelation in
the idiosyncratic error term. Section 4.2 outlined that the requirement for exogeneity in a
GMM setting can only be fulfilled provided that serial correlation among the instruments’
and instrumented variables’ disturbance terms is not an issue. As pointed out by Roodman
(2009), autocorrelation of first order in levels corresponds to autocorrelation of second
order in differences17. Therefore, serial correlation statistics are reported as of degree 2.
Furthermore, if significant autocorrelation of degree g is detected18, GMM instruments are
restricted to lags g+1 and longer following Roodman (2009). In Column 1, second order
autocorrelation is insignificant and therefore, the investment rate at t-1 is instrumented
by its previous values, lagged once and twice.
Analogously, the same logic can be applied in order to interpret the results summarised
in the remaining columns. This leads to the observation that apart from the logarithmised
price index, the cash flow rate, the regulatory indicator for market structure as well as the
logarithmised tangible fixed assets are found to Granger (1969) cause the investment rate
at a significance level of 10%. Accounting for the caveats associated with Granger (1969)
causalities, the coefficients are not interpreted quantitatively in this preliminary analysis.
It should be noted, however, that all their signs go in reasonable directions19.
15For revenues, only ∆ log revenues are considered.
16Modelling the column variable differently does not change the general conclusions presented here.
Detailed results are available upon request.
17Let t be the error term at time t. Then, ∆t = t − t−1 and ∆t as well as ∆t−1 which share the
term t−1 are negatively correlated by construction. Consequently, correlation between t−1 and t−2 can
only be evaluated informatively by examining ∆t together with ∆t−2 (Roodman, 2009).
18This corresponds to a p-value lower than 0.05.
19Certainly, the effects of the logarithmised price index and the regulatory indicator for market structure
are not clear from a theoretical standpoint. What is more, empirical papers identify contradicting results,
see with regard to the former variable Kilian (2008) for the US energy sector as well as Gugler et al.
(2013) for the EU electricity sector and concerning the latter Alesina et al. (2005) for OECD infrastructure
sectors, Nardi (2012) for the EU electricity sector and Esposito et al. (in press) for the EU railway sector.
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Table 4: Simple Granger (1969) causalities. Estimated with GMM, containing firm as well as time fixed
effects. Instrument lags appropriately defined and restricted to two. Estimation implemented in Stata
using xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009). Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac, 2015). Robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(1) (2) (3)
log Price Index ∆ log Revenues Cash Flow Rate
Investment Ratet-1 0.459
∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.114
(0.094) (0.082) (0.179)
Column Variablet-1 −0.638∗∗ −0.021 0.271∗∗
(0.263) (0.084) (0.132)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 204 110 114
Number of Instruments 36 18 21
Hansen Test p-value 0.818 NA 0.040
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.109 0.205 0.029
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.054 0.141 0.292
(4) (5) (6)
Share Renewables (without Hydro) Share Renewables (Total) log Load
Investment Ratet-1 0.149 −0.270 0.450∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.278) (0.105)
Column Variablet-1 −2.523 0.567 −0.936
(3.058) (2.747) (0.708)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 183 183 164
Number of Instruments 30 29 36
Hansen Test p-value 0.207 0.140 0.996
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.022 0.117 0.242
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.104 0.106 0.207
(7) (8) (9)
log Long Term Interest Rate Regulation (Entry) Regulation (Public Ownership)
Investment Ratet-1 −0.143 0.101 0.460∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.174) (0.171)
Column Variablet-1 −0.022 0.009 0.050
(0.094) (0.020) (0.062)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 190 169 169
Number of Instruments 32 31 33
Hansen Test p-value 0.854 0.734 0.633
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.043 0.023 0.050
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.128 0.060 0.104
(10) (11) (12)
Regulation (Vertical Integration) Regulation (Market Structure) log Tangible Fixed Assets
Investment Ratet-1 −0.082 0.486∗∗∗ 0.099
(0.279) (0.150) (0.209)
Column Variablet-1 0.146 0.061
∗ −0.304∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.033) (0.109)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 169 159 204
Number of Instruments 29 33 34
Hansen Test p-value 0.748 0.788 0.868
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.126 0.118 0.009
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.056 0.084 0.159
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5: Simple (reverse) Granger (1969) causalities. Estimated with GMM, containing firm as well as
time fixed effects. Instrument lags appropriately defined and restricted to two. Estimation implemented in
Stata using xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009). Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac, 2015). Robust standard
errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.
Dependent variable:
Column Variablet
(1) (2) (3)
log Price Index ∆ log Revenues Cash Flow Rate
Investment Ratet-1 −0.362∗ 1.456 0.340
(0.210) (0.935) (0.214)
Column Variablet-1 0.754
∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗ −0.741∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.103) (0.035)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 207 110 112
Number of Instruments 39 15 18
Hansen Test p-value 0.871 NA NA
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.743 0.227 0.094
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.744 0.309 0.988
(4) (5) (6)
Share Renewables (without Hydro) Share Renewables (Total) log Load
Investment Ratet-1 0.116 0.003 −0.280
(0.076) (0.111) (0.178)
Column Variablet-1 0.934
∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗
(0.150) (0.154) (0.128)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 186 186 163
Number of Instruments 27 27 38
Hansen Test p-value 0.107 0.035 0.955
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.548 0.409 0.695
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.225 0.429 0.665
(7) (8) (9)
log Long Term Interest Rate Regulation (Entry) Regulation (Public Ownership)
Investment Ratet-1 0.173 8.442
∗ −0.341
(0.606) (4.668) (0.544)
Column Variablet-1 −0.168∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗
(0.052) (0.055) (0.268)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 193 147 147
Number of Instruments 39 33 33
Hansen Test p-value 0.403 0.854 0.991
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.497 0.482 0.409
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.242 0.850 0.795
(10) (11) (12)
Regulation (Vertical Integration) Regulation (Market Structure) log Tangible Fixed Assets
Investment Ratet-1 −0.945 2.392 0.031
(0.724) (2.025) (0.349)
Column Variablet-1 0.550
∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.134) (0.146)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 147 137 205
Number of Instruments 31 31 38
Hansen Test p-value 0.833 0.475 0.906
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.978 0.288 0.140
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.459 0.720 0.071
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Interestingly, the significance of the lagged investment rate strongly depends on the
lag structure of its instruments. In Columns 1, 2, 6, 9 and 11, where the test for auto-
correlation in differences permits instrumenting the time-displaced investment rate with
lags 2 and 3, its previous value is positive and significant. However, the instrument set
has to be lagged longer in the remaining columns and the significance disappears.
Finally, the p-values of the Hansen test are plausible in general. An unexpectedly high
statistic can only be found in Column 6, while no p-value is available in Column 2 due to
the small number of instruments.
The issue of reverse causality is addressed by Table 5, where the respective column
variable is predicted by lagged realisations of the investment rate and itself. Illustrated
again on the basis of Column 1, the logarithmised price index at time t serves as the
dependent variable and the investment rate as well as the logarithmised price index at
t-1 as regressors. At the 10% significance level, both coefficients are significantly different
from zero, indicating that reverse causality matters. As before, the number of observations
and instruments as well as p-values of the Hansen test and tests for serial correlation in
the residuals are reported in the bottom panel of Column 1.
Apart from the logarithmised price index, potential reverse causation is only identified
for the regulatory indicator of entry. Consequently, this issue is minor in the present
analysis, but nevertheless motivates to instrument these variables in the context of the
proposed GMM approach.
To summarise the remaining results, all column variables are significantly predicted by
their previous values. Moreover, all autocorrelation tests permit to instrument the lagged
dependent variable with its immediately preceding realisations. Finally, the Hansen test
statistics are reasonable in general, although not available for Columns 2 as well as 3 and
somewhat critical in Columns 5, 6, 9 and 12.
5.2 Regression Results from the Entire Sample
This subsection goes one step further and presents regression results of Equation 14,
Equation 15 and their extensions outlined in Section 4.1 by considering the entire dataset
available. For this purpose, the fixed effects estimator is applied, before GMM approaches
follow.
Fixed Effects Estimation As outlined in Section 4.2, the fixed effects estimation
proposed here includes the lagged dependent variable in order not to suffer from omitted
variable bias. Nevertheless, the regression results have to be interpreted with caution as
a possible bias arises out of the small amount of time periods available. Therefore, error
correction mechanisms are exclusively addressed with GMM techniques.
Applying the fixed effects estimator on the relationships of interest yields the results
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presented in Table 6 which reports coefficients and their respective standard errors. Fur-
thermore, the number of observations, two goodness-of-fit measures20 as well as the F
statistic for the regression21 are summarised in every column.
To begin with, Column 1 presents the base model, where the current investment rate
is explained by lagged values of itself and the logarithmised price index, the change in
logarithmised revenues as well as the previous cash flow rate. Subsequently, Column
2 introduces the current share of renewables excluding hydroelectric power, before the
remaining columns successively introduce lagged values of the logarithmised load and long
term interest rate as well as those of the regulatory indicators.
Turning to the specific estimates yields several notable results. First of all, the lagged
investment rate is highly significant in all specifications and takes values between 0.5
and 0.7. This implies that, ceteris paribus, a rise in the investment expenditure per unit
of (lagged) capital by one standard deviation in the current period raises the succeeding
investment rate by roughly 0.6 standard deviations. These results constitute a first indica-
tion for path dependencies in the electricity sector and are in accordance with the findings
of Alesina et al. (2005), Lyon and Mayo (2005), Cambini and Rondi (2010), Gugler et al.
(2013), Cullmann and Nieswand (2016), Poudineh and Jamasb (2016) as well as Cambini
and Rondi (2017).
In addition, the lagged cash flow rate is also found to be a significant predictor in all
specifications, taking values between 0.2 and 0.3. Again, the positive sign corresponds to
the expectations and matches with the results of Cambini and Rondi (2010) as well as
Cambini and Rondi (2017). Quantitatively, a rise in the contemporary cash flow rate by
one standard deviation increases the subsequent investment rate by around 0.35 standard
deviations. As discussed in Section 4, the identified relationship can, however, not only
be linked with capital market imperfections, but also with the firms’ expectations.
The final variable discovered to significantly predict the investment rate is the log-
arithmised price index, albeit this holds for only half of the specifications at the 10%
significance level, which does not allow general conclusions. Interestingly, the positive
correlation from Table 3 in Section 3 has however changed to a negative relationship.
Turning to the share of renewables and thereby to the variable of main interest, no
20The R2 is defined as
1− SSR
SST
,
while the adjusted R2 imposes a penalty for every additionally added independent variable and is given
as
1−
SSR
n−l−1
SST
n−1
,
provided that n denotes the number of observations, l the amount of explanatory variables, SST the sum
of squares of the dependent variable and SSR that of the residuals. Building on this, the R2 and adjusted
R2 in Table 6 are defined as the time variation in the dependent variable which is explained by the time
variation in the regressors (within R2 and within adjusted R2) (Wooldridge, 2013).
21The null hypothesis of this test statistic is that a model’s explanatory variables are jointly insignificant
(Wooldridge, 2013).
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Table 6: Fixed effects estimation of the investment rate, containing firm as well as time fixed effects.
Implemented in R using the package plm (Croissant et al., 2016). Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac,
2015). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Renewables (without Hydro)t-1 −0.055 −0.212 −0.230
(0.257) (0.445) (0.285)
Investment Ratet-1 0.600
∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.087) (0.099) (0.097)
log Price Indext-1 −0.208∗ −0.205∗ −0.227∗ −0.214
(0.119) (0.105) (0.133) (0.145)
∆ log Revenuest −0.041 −0.040 −0.081 −0.080
(0.037) (0.037) (0.057) (0.048)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.208
∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.219∗∗
(0.073) (0.094) (0.080) (0.088)
log Loadt-1 0.031
(0.170)
log Long Term Interest Ratet-1 −0.004
(0.029)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 133 132 117 123
R2 0.361 0.361 0.358 0.365
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.138 0.080 0.120
F Statistic 13.860∗∗∗ (df = 4; 98) 10.980∗∗∗ (df = 5; 97) 7.522∗∗∗ (df = 6; 81) 8.433∗∗∗ (df = 6; 88)
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Share Renewables (without Hydro)t-1 −0.183 −0.182 −0.153 −0.153
(0.295) (0.297) (0.307) (0.313)
Investment Ratet-1 0.512
∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.103) (0.114) (0.102)
log Price Indext-1 −0.244 −0.235∗ −0.220 −0.258∗
(0.148) (0.140) (0.148) (0.135)
∆ log Revenuest −0.002 −0.006 −0.005 −0.001
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.275
∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070)
Regulation Entryt-1 −0.003
(0.016)
Regulation Public Ownershipt-1 −0.151
(0.216)
Regulation Vertical Integrationt-1 0.054
(0.035)
Regulation Market Structuret-1 −0.010
(0.019)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 113 113 113 112
R2 0.333 0.334 0.337 0.343
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.044 0.047 0.053
F Statistic 6.494∗∗∗ (df = 6; 78) 6.520∗∗∗ (df = 6; 78) 6.595∗∗∗ (df = 6; 78) 6.704∗∗∗ (df = 6; 77)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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significant impact on the investment rate can be found. Moreover, the coefficients of
the changes in logarithmised revenues, the lagged logarithmised load and long term in-
terest rate as well as the time-displaced regulatory indicators neither prove themselves
significant.
As has been outlined above, the fixed effects estimations only constitute a first impres-
sion of the underlying relationship between the variables of interest. In order to provide
a profound analysis, more advanced estimation techniques are discussed below.
General Methods of Moments Estimation Results from the onestep difference
GMM estimator including time fixed effects are summarised in Table 7 and Table 8.
The former table does not contain error correction terms, while the latter takes these
mechanisms explicitly into account. Furthermore, both estimation approaches consider
the reverse causality issues detected in Table 5 and therefore regard not only lagged values
of the investment rate, but also those of the price index and the regulatory indicator for
entry as endogenous. What is more, the amount of instrument lags in Table 7 is again
restricted to two in order not to give rise to the problem of too many instruments. In
addition, the remaining regressors are assumed to be completely exogenous and therefore
utilised as additional instruments22.
Turning to the results outlined in Table 7 and comparing them with those from Table 6
shows that the obtained coefficients for the lagged investment rate and cash flow rate are
very robust to the different estimators. Again, preceding values of the investment rate
and of the cash flow rate impact the current investment rate significantly positively. Even
the size of the coefficients is comparable, leading to an interpretation analogous to the
fixed effects results summarised above23.
In addition, the regulatory indicator for public ownership is found to negatively influ-
ence the investment rate at the 10% significance level. This means that a more private
ownership structure of the most dominant players in the electricity sector is in line with
enhanced investment spending.
Again, the share of renewables which constitutes the main variable of interest is not
found to significantly influence the investment rate, although the respective coefficients
exhibit a negative sign in all models. What is more, the price index loses its significance in
all specifications, but keeps its unequivocal negative sign. Besides, neither the coefficient
associated with ∆ log revenues nor those with lagged values of the logarithmised load and
long term interest rate or of the remaining regulatory indicators demonstrate significance.
Finally, the p-values of the Hansen test statistics do not indicate problems with the
applied set of instruments, even though they are unexpectedly high in Columns 3 and 5.
22As shown in Section 5.4 below, a softening of this assumption does not alter the general messages
developed here.
23An exception with regard to the size of the coefficients can be found in Column 4, where the tests for
autocorrelation do not permit the use of lagged values of order two as GMM instruments. Nevertheless,
the general pattern with regard to the coefficients’ signs and significance is confirmed.
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The final set of regressions concerning the unrestricted sample is summarised in Ta-
ble 8. The models presented here correspond to those in Table 7, but are supplemented
with the error correction terms from Equation 14. Again, the lagged explanatory vari-
ables investment rate, logarithmised price index as well as the regulatory indicator for
entry are permitted not to behave completely exogenously. In addition, the same permis-
sion is given to the lagged and logarithmised tangible fixed assets as this variable is by
definition a component of the investment rate. As before, the remaining set of variables
is, however, modelled as completely exogenous.
An immediate consequence of the necessarily generous allowance of endogeneity pat-
terns lies in a strong rise in the required instruments. In order to overcome the problem of
too many instruments which has been discussed above, the strategy pursued here builds
on the recommendation of Roodman (2009) by collapsing the available instrument set
into one single column24. This approach is comparable with Holl (2012) and permits to
increase the maximum amount of lags used as instruments (Roodman, 2009) which was
set to nine in the regressions presented in Table 825.
Turning to the regression results, current values of the investment rate are again well
predicted by and depend positively on their lagged realisations, even if the coefficients’ size
24To provide an example, let hi,t be a variable which is instrumented by its lags of order two and further,
where i denotes a specific individual and t a point in time. Then, the common way of representing the
instruments looks as follows. 
0 0 . . . 0 0
hi,t−2 0 . . . 0 0
0 hi,t−3 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 hi,t−T 0

Consequently, the amount of required instruments equals T−1 and the following set of moment conditions
must be satisfied for each t ≥ 3 in order to fulfil the condition of instrument exogeneity.∑
i
hi,t−2i,t = 0,
where i,t constitutes the error term. As an alternative, is is possible to collapse the available sequence
of instruments into one single column, leading to
0
hi,t−2
hi,t−3
...
hi,t−T
 ,
This single column requires only one moment condition to be fulfilled, namely∑
i,t
hi,t−2i,t = 0
and therefore reduces the instrument count dramatically (Roodman, 2009).
25The general implications of the estimates are robust to various lag structures. Further results are
available upon request.
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Table 7: General methods of moments estimation of the investment rate without error correction terms,
containing firm as well as time fixed effects. Instrument lags appropriately defined and restricted to two.
Implemented in Stata using xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009). Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac, 2015).
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Renewablest −0.359 −0.524 −0.774
(0.372) (0.435) (0.559)
Investment Ratet-1 0.526
∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.247∗
(0.098) (0.105) (0.094) (0.136)
log Price Indext-1 −0.196 −0.162 −0.163 0.013
(0.133) (0.135) (0.127) (0.229)
∆ log Revenuest 0.034 0.034 −0.003 −0.029
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.026)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.234
∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.072)
log Loadt-1 −0.069
(0.132)
log Long Term Interest Ratet-1 0.003
(0.003)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 108 108 94 101
Number of Instruments 37 38 39 39
Hansen Test p-value 0.796 0.806 0.997 0.706
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.458 0.454 0.432 0.050
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.098 0.122 0.120 0.119
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Share Renewablest −0.052 −0.318 −0.458 −0.349
(0.452) (0.462) (0.484) (0.470)
Investment Ratet-1 0.354
∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.118) (0.119) (0.110)
log Price Indext-1 −0.204 −0.166 −0.159 −0.196
(0.155) (0.139) (0.150) (0.141)
∆ log Revenuest 0.026 0.037 0.041 0.047
(0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.240
∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.080) (0.082) (0.081)
Regulation Entryt-1 0.007
(0.024)
Regulation Public Ownershipt-1 −0.482∗
(0.286)
Regulation Vertical Integrationt-1 0.002
(0.099)
Regulation Market Structuret-1 0.016
(0.021)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 89 89 89 88
Number of Instruments 44 34 34 34
Hansen Test p-value 0.938 0.569 0.568 0.447
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.254 0.372 0.363 0.478
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.397 0.511 0.451 0.212
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 8: General methods of moments estimation of the investment rate, including error correction terms,
containing firm as well as time fixed effects. Collapsed instrument lags appropriately defined and restricted
to nine. Implemented in Stata using xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009). Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac,
2015). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Renewablest 0.248 0.598 0.342
(0.652) (0.812) (0.737)
Investment Ratet-1 0.380
∗∗ 0.383∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗
(0.180) (0.179) (0.125) (0.156)
log Tangible Fixed Assetst-1 −0.317∗∗ −0.330∗∗ −0.345∗∗ −0.334∗∗
(0.128) (0.143) (0.169) (0.140)
log Revenuest-1 0.076 0.068 0.018 0.071
(0.069) (0.068) (0.077) (0.088)
log Price Indext-1 −0.148 −0.162 −0.120 −0.134
(0.112) (0.134) (0.104) (0.202)
∆ log Revenuest 0.037 0.033 0.002 0.018
(0.031) (0.034) (0.040) (0.043)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.153
∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026)
log Loadt-1 0.278
(0.183)
log Long Term Interest Ratet-1 0.000
(0.004)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 108 108 94 101
Number of Instruments 37 38 39 39
Hansen Test p-value 0.864 0.877 0.838 0.845
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.057 0.065 0.248 0.024
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.065 0.070 0.161 0.197
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Share Renewablest −0.299 −0.317 −0.310 −0.282
(0.640) (0.652) (0.614) (0.643)
Investment Ratet-1 0.229 0.242
∗ 0.243∗ 0.279∗
(0.156) (0.141) (0.146) (0.142)
log Tangible Fixed Assetst-1 −0.315∗∗ −0.320∗∗ −0.333∗∗ −0.317∗∗
(0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.145)
log Revenuest-1 0.058 0.066 0.066 0.069
(0.080) (0.067) (0.069) (0.067)
log Price Indext-1 −0.174 −0.182 −0.212 −0.208
(0.141) (0.148) (0.155) (0.141)
∆ log Revenuest 0.033 0.040 0.039 0.041
(0.044) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.167
∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Regulation Entryt-1 0.009
(0.028)
Regulation Public Ownershipt-1 0.067
(0.256)
Regulation Vertical Integrationt-1 −0.051
(0.090)
Regulation Market Structuret-1 0.009
(0.016)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 89 89 89 88
Number of Instruments 37 38 38 38
Hansen Test p-value 0.992 0.892 0.957 0.501
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.038 0.032 0.031 0.035
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.124 0.109 0.129 0.123
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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decreases and the significance disappears entirely in Column 5. These results appear as a
reasonable consequence of including the tangible fixed assets error correction term whose
coefficients are, as in Gugler et al. (2013), negative and significant in all specifications.
Since the remaining error correction term for revenues is never found to significantly
determine the investment rate, the models’ coefficients establish a stable equilibrium as
expected. Furthermore, the cash flow rate acts as the only remaining variable identified as
a significant predictor. Again, the respective coefficients assume positive, albeit smaller,
values in all models. This implies that neither the share of renewables nor the other
included variables are found to significantly influence the investment rate.
Finally, the p-values of the Hansen test statistics take reasonable values, but raise
slight concerns in Columns 5 as well as 7 and the instrument lags are defined appropri-
ately in all specifications.
To summarise, the estimation approaches conducted in this subsection indicate that
the current investment rate positively depends on lagged values of itself as well as on
the cash flow rate. In addition, a significant and balancing error correction mechanism
can be identified with regard to tangible fixed assets. What is more, some specifications
certify a negative impact of the previous logarithmised price index as well as the regulatory
indicator for public ownership.
The lagged share of renewables is never found to significantly affect the investment rate.
Therefore, the following subsection develops an explanatory approach for this observed
pattern and carries out further investigations.
5.3 Regression Results from the Restricted Sample
A possible concern with regard to the regression results presented in Section 5.2 follows
from the observation that the proportion of solid bio fuels in the measure share of re-
newables varies considerably not only between, but also within countries as illustrated
by Figure 6 that shows the respective differences in percentage points. As can easily be
seen, substantial variations occur in Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia. This observation is formally confirmed by Table 9 which shows
that the respective standard deviations for this set of countries are relatively high and
take absolute values well above 0.1.
Obviously, the estimation approaches pursued in Section 5.2 are not able to control
for these variations. The coefficients of the share of renewables have therefore to be
regarded as biased should the investment rate react differently to various compositions
of renewable energy sources26. In order to overcome this issue, those six countries which
exhibit a standard deviation of the annual differences in the ratio of solid bio fuels to all
26In this framework, solid bio fuels that can be regarded as a base load component as outlined in
Section 3 above are taken into account.
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Figure 6: Annual differences in the ratio of solid bio fuels to all other renewables except for hydroelectric
sources (Eurostat, 2017a). Illustrated in Mathematica.
renewables (except for hydroelectric sources) exceeding 0.1 are excluded from the sample.
Regression results based on this restricted set of countries are presented in Table 10.
The models summarised here correspond to Table 9, but restrict the number of GMM
instruments to six due to the smaller amount of observations available.
Now, the coefficients of the lagged share of renewables are highly significant in almost
all specifications and take values between 0.8 and 1.2. Quantitatively, this implies that
a rise in the current share of renewables by ten percentage points raises next period’s
investment per unit of (lagged) capital by around one standard deviation. This is sub-
stantial in absolute terms, as illustrated by Table 11 for a selected set of five countries.
Based on the year 2015, a 10 percentage point rise in the share of renewables elevates
grid investments in Austria by 126 Million, in Germany by 613 Million, in France by 1.5
Billion and in Italy by 1.0 Billion euro.
Table 9: Standard deviations of the annual differences in the ratio of solid bio fuels to all other renewables
except for hydroelectric sources (Eurostat, 2017a). Bold numbers indicate standard deviations larger than
0.10. Implemented in R. Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac, 2015).
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU
0.04 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.27 0.04
IE IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
0.01 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.27 0.03
Turning to the remaining variables, the coefficients of the lagged investment rate and
cash flow rate as well as the error correction term for logarithmised tangible fixed assets
exhibit signs and significance comparable with Table 9. For this restricted set of countries,
even the error correction term of logarithmised revenues is positive and significant in
almost all columns, but still produces a stable model. Moreover, around half of the
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Table 10: General methods of moments estimation of the investment rate, including error correction
terms, containing firm as well as time fixed effects. Collapsed instrument lags appropriately defined and
restricted to six. Countries excluded: Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic and
Slovenia. Implemented in Stata using xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009). Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac,
2015). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Renewablest 0.817
∗∗ 1.200∗∗ 0.539
(0.412) (0.488) (0.474)
Investment Ratet-1 0.259
∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.130) (0.112) (0.103)
log Tangible Fixed Assetst-1 −0.377∗∗∗ −0.385∗∗∗ −0.542∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.138) (0.164) (0.120)
log Revenuest-1 0.167
∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.109 0.240∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.072) (0.087) (0.076)
log Price Indext-1 −0.195 −0.289∗ −0.203 −0.163
(0.165) (0.161) (0.158) (0.245)
∆ log Revenuest 0.061
∗ 0.041 0.014 0.025
(0.037) (0.031) (0.062) (0.048)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.151
∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
log Loadt-1 0.393
∗∗∗
(0.149)
log Long Term Interest Ratet-1 0.001
(0.003)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 88 88 74 81
Number of Instruments 28 29 30 30
Hansen Test p-value 0.360 0.217 0.933 0.922
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.270 0.222 0.819 0.197
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.187 0.162 0.746 0.705
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Share Renewablest 0.993
∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.297) (0.292) (0.327)
Investment Ratet-1 0.578
∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.173) (0.190) (0.171)
log Tangible Fixed Assetst-1 −0.540∗∗∗ −0.519∗∗∗ −0.554∗∗∗ −0.522∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.082) (0.073) (0.082)
log Revenuest-1 0.156
∗ 0.151∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.153∗
(0.081) (0.078) (0.077) (0.079)
log Price Indext-1 −0.401∗∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗ −0.441∗∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.131) (0.132) (0.127)
∆ log Revenuest 0.051 0.047 0.067 0.049
(0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.078
∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.025) (0.029)
Regulation Entryt-1 NA
NA
Regulation Public Ownershipt-1 −0.180
(0.287)
Regulation Vertical Integrationt-1 −0.122∗∗
(0.046)
Regulation Market Structuret-1 0.004
(0.017)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 74 74 74 74
Number of Instruments 28 29 29 29
Hansen Test p-value 0.099 0.101 0.379 0.267
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.947 0.739 0.868 0.675
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.122 0.115 0.231 0.108
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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specifications assert a negative influence of the lagged and logarithmised price index and
even changes in the logarithmised revenues border with significance.
Table 11: Additional investments in power transmission networks resulting from a 10% increase in the
share of renewables (no hydro). Figures based on the year 2015 and stated in Million euro. Implemented
in R. Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac, 2015).
XX XX AT XX XX DE XX XX FR XX XX IT XX XX
126.3 613.2 1545.2 1014.2
With regard to the lagged additional variables, two of them are found to significantly
influence the current investment rate. First of all, logarithmised values of the load posi-
tively affect this variable which is in line with Lyon and Mayo (2005). Specifically, a rise
in the time-displaced load by one percent rises the investment rate by around 3.8 stan-
dard deviations. Secondly, more deregulation in the field of vertical integration increases
investment spending. However, all coefficients of the other variables stay insignificant and
the regulatory indicator for entry has to be dropped due to its lack in variability. Finally,
the lags for the GMM instruments are again chosen in view of the autocorrelation tests
and the p-values of the Hansen test statistic are all insignificant, albeit unexpectedly high
in Columns 3 and 4.
To conclude, this restricted sample of countries with a stable share of solid bio fuels
yields significantly positive coefficients for the main variable of interest which implies a
considerable effect of renewable energy resources on power grid investment. What is more,
the effects of the remaining explanatory variables appear reasonable from a theoretical
standpoint and are supported by empirical investigations.
5.4 Robustness Checks
In order to increase the validity of the results presented so far, they are subjected to a
series of robustness checks in this subsection.
To begin with, Table 12 repeats Columns 1 and 2 from Table 7 as well as Table 8,
but treats all explanatory variables as endogenous. Consequently, the amount of required
instruments raises considerably which is addressed by adequately defining, restricting
and collapsing them. Turning to the regression results, the coefficients and their levels
of significance remain almost unchanged which implies that the general conclusions are
not sensitive to the changes made with regard to the endogeneity assumption. A notable
exception can however be found in Column 3, where the variables describing logarithmised
revenues positively affect the investment rate. This pattern can also be found in Table 10
and is in line with the expectations from Section 4.1.
In addition, it is worth examining if the regression results depend on a different defini-
tion of the share of renewables. Therefore, Table 14 replicates Column 2 of Table 7 as well
as Table 8, where hydroelectric power is added to the share of renewables and all instru-
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Table 12: General methods of moments estimation of the investment rate, permitting that all explanatory
variables are endogenous, containing firm as well as time fixed effects. Instrument lags appropriately de-
fined, restricted and collapsed. No sample restrictions undertaken. Implemented in Stata using xtabond2
(Roodman, 2009). Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac, 2015). Robust standard errors clustered at the
firm level in parenthesis.
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Renewablest 0.092 0.761
(0.627) (0.762)
Investment Ratet-1 0.439
∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.164) (0.092) (0.097)
log Tangible Fixed Assetst-1 −0.264∗∗ −0.281∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.106)
log Revenuest-1 0.121
∗ 0.017
(0.065) (0.079)
log Price Indext-1 −0.153 −0.096 −0.313 −0.231
(0.184) (0.177) (0.237) (0.164)
∆ log Revenuest 0.025 0.074 0.125
∗∗ 0.080
(0.055) (0.060) (0.051) (0.065)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.238
∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.040) (0.039) (0.033)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 108 108 108 108
Number of Instruments 37 32 31 35
Hansen Test p-value 0.851 0.391 0.185 0.573
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.296 0.479 0.124 0.122
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.134 0.268 0.124 0.088
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
39
5.4 Robustness Checks 5 Results
Table 13: General methods of moments estimation of the investment rate, containing firm as well as
time fixed effects. Share renewables comprises hydroelectric power. Instrument lags appropriately de-
fined, restricted and collapsed. No sample restrictions undertaken. Implemented in Stata using xtabond2
(Roodman, 2009). Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac, 2015). Robust standard errors clustered at the
firm level in parenthesis.
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(1) (2)
Share Renewablest −0.157 0.333
(0.301) (0.567)
Investment Ratet-1 0.515
∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗
(0.104) (0.180)
log Tangible Fixed Assetst-1 −0.331∗∗
(0.140)
log Revenuest-1 0.065
(0.067)
log Price Indext-1 −0.182 −0.168
(0.136) (0.126)
∆ log Revenuest 0.033 0.034
(0.030) (0.032)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.233
∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.031)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Number of Observations 108 108
Number of Instruments 38 38
Hansen Test p-value 0.745 0.828
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.447 0.067
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.110 0.065
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
40
5.4 Robustness Checks 5 Results
ment lags are properly defined, restricted and collapsed. With regard to the regression
results, all coefficients and their respective standard errors remain virtually unaffected
and the share of renewables (total) is not found to significantly predict the investment
rate.
Finally, Table 14 performs the same regressions as Table 10, but again replaces the
share of renewables (hydro) by the share of renewables (total). Interestingly, the signif-
icance of this predictor remains, while the size of its coefficient decreases in all models.
This implies that even if hydroelectric power is considered, an increasing share of renew-
ables leads to a rising investment rate in the restricted set of countries. Concerning the
remaining explanatory variables, their coefficients and significance levels permit the same
conclusions as outlined in Section 5.3 above.
To conclude, the robustness checks performed in this subsection support the results
derived previously and therefore strengthen their validity.
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Table 14: General methods of moments estimation of the investment rate, including error correction
terms, containing firm as well as time fixed effects. Share renewables comprises hydroelectric power.
Collapsed instrument lags appropriately defined and restricted to six. Countries excluded: Croatia,
Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Implemented in Stata using xtabond2
(Roodman, 2009). Table adapted from stargazer (Hlavac, 2015). Robust standard errors clustered at the
firm level in parenthesis.
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Renewablest 0.721
∗∗ 0.816∗∗ 0.470
(0.348) (0.404) (0.374)
Investment Ratet-1 0.259
∗ 0.292∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.121) (0.109) (0.095)
log Tangible Fixed Assetst-1 −0.377∗∗∗ −0.387∗∗∗ −0.538∗∗∗ −0.478∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.139) (0.170) (0.119)
log Revenuest-1 0.167
∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.137 0.249∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.074) (0.088) (0.076)
log Price Indext-1 −0.195 −0.274∗ −0.183 −0.160
(0.165) (0.165) (0.172) (0.253)
∆ log Revenuest 0.061
∗ 0.052 0.029 0.032
(0.037) (0.032) (0.063) (0.049)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.151
∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
log Loadt-1 0.385
∗∗
(0.151)
log Long Term Interest Ratet-1 0.001
(0.003)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 88 88 74 81
Number of Instruments 28 29 30 30
Hansen Test p-value 0.360 0.612 0.956 0.974
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.270 0.225 0.481 0.181
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.187 0.149 0.804 0.731
Dependent variable:
Investment Ratet
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Share Renewablest 0.732
∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.201) (0.207) (0.220)
Investment Ratet-1 0.551
∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.155) (0.167) (0.153)
log Tangible Fixed Assetst-1 −0.525∗∗∗ −0.510∗∗∗ −0.541∗∗∗ −0.511∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.085) (0.075) (0.085)
log Revenuest-1 0.164
∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.081) (0.079) (0.079) (0.081)
log Price Indext-1 −0.401∗∗∗ −0.422∗∗∗ −0.441∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.133) (0.137) (0.131)
∆ log Revenuest 0.064 0.063 0.078
∗ 0.064
(0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
Cash Flow Ratet-1 0.085
∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026)
Regulation Entryt-1 NA
NA
Regulation Public Ownershipt-1 −0.125
(0.269)
Regulation Vertical Integrationt-1 −0.122∗∗∗
(0.047)
Regulation Market Structuret-1 0.002
(0.016)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 74 74 74 74
Number of Instruments 28 29 29 29
Hansen Test p-value 0.084 0.097 0.393 0.293
Diff. Autocorr. Test (2) p-value 0.877 0.660 0.811 0.606
Diff. Autocorr. Test (3) p-value 0.123 0.106 0.254 0.107
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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6 Policy Implications and Conclusions
This paper aims at examining if the increasing importance of renewable energy sources
in electricity generation stimulates investment in European power transmission networks.
It is therefore located in the rapidly growing body of literature which analyses the wel-
fare implications of this relatively novel energy source from a theoretical and empirical
perspective.
The introduced error correction models build on Neoclassical investment theory which
is augmented by capital constraints, future expectations, output prices, capacity con-
siderations, interest rates and the regulatory environment. Within this framework, the
proportion of renewable generation in total electricity output which enters the models in
two different types constitutes the variable of main interest.
Regression results are obtained from Granger (1969) causalities, ordinary least squares
techniques and general methods of moments procedures. While the variable of main
interest is not found to significantly influence investment spending when the full set of
transmission system operators is considered, a slight and justified sample restriction leads
to the conclusion that a rising share of renewable energy sources substantially increases
investment in power transmission networks. What is more, evidence indicates that power
transmission investment is characterised by path dependencies and determined by an
operator’s cash flow.
The most obvious implication which can be derived from these results is that renew-
able energy policies must not only address generation capacities, but also consider power
transmission networks. In this regard, the European Commission (2010) states:
“Europe is still lacking the grid infrastructure which will enable renewables to
develop and compete on an equal footing with traditional sources. Current
projects of large-scale wind parks in the North and solar facilities in the South
need corresponding power lines capable of transmitting this green power to the
areas of high consumption. Today’s grid will struggle to absorb the volumes of
renewable power which the 2020 targets entail (...).” (European Commission,
2010, p. 10).
The present paper identifies evidence that the increasing share of renewables indeed stim-
ulates investment behaviour, but does neither answer if the additional expenditures suffice
to ensure a stable grid that satisfies the stochastic nature of most renewable energy sources
nor which policy framework leads to the most efficient power grid nor who should bear
the investment cost. Rather, these questions pave the way for future research.
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